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ment in the Sunshine Act"6 provide broad access to substantial
governmental information. Additionally, all states have enacted laws which in varying degrees minimize governmental
secrecy.57 And the saga of Watergate has reminded the American public that even without a constitutionally mandated right
of access, the press can and will continue to perform its vital
function as the watchdog of democracy.58
Dian Marie Tooley
TEN YEAR AcQuIsrrIvE PRESCRIPTION: GOOD FAITH AND
INTERRUPTION

Defendant in a petitory action asserted ownership to certain lands under claims of ten' and thirty' year acquisitive
prescription.' The Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized
accessibility of much governmental information, Congressional intent in amending the
Act was to narrow the exemptions. See, Sen. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1974).
See generally R. GORDON, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT
(1977); GOVERNMENT INFORMATION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, SUNSHINE ACr, PiVACY

ACT 77 (1978);

LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

ACT 3 (3d ed. 1977); S. THURMAN, THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM THE
GOVERNMENT (Legal almanac series, no. 71. 1973).
In addition to legislative intent that the exemptions be narrowly construed, Attorney General Griffin Bell has advised federal agencies to comply with requests for
information, adding the caveat that "the Justice Department will defend Freedom of
Information Act suits only when disclosure is demonstrably harmful, even if the documents technically fall within the exemptions in the Act." Bell, supra note 51.
But see PRIVACY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURES, supra note 3, at 107, where it is argued

that the press often does not benefit from FOIA inasmuch as government has ten days
to comply with requests. Thus the press may not receive the information in time to
publish it. See also Nader, Freedom From Information, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
2 (1970), where it is charged that the FOIA has been "forged into a shield against
citizen access."
56. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
57. Statutory references are compiled in S.THURMAN, supra note 55, at 67-84.
58. In lieu of the present free press clause in the first amendment, James Madison's proposed amendment would have read: "[T]he freedom of the press, as one of
the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Gales &
Seaton eds. 1789).
1.
2.

LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3478-98.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3499-3505.

3. The plaintiff had already lost a possessory action brought by the defendant
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plaintiff's title and, with respect to defendant's claim of prescription, held: (1) since defendant bought the property under
a single deed in which part was transferred with full warranty
of title' and part was transferred only by quitclaim deed,5 the
defendant lacked the good faith required to sustain ownership
based on a claim of ten year acquisitive prescription; and (2)
construction of a pipeline and maintenance of a twenty-foot
wide servitude across the property, under a grant from the
plaintiff, interrupted the defendant's possession as to the entire
106 acre tract. Board of Commissioners of the Caddo Levee
District v. S.D. HunterFoundation, 354 So. 2d 156 (La. 1978).
Article 3479 of the Louisiana Civil Code lists four conditions which must be met in order to acquire ownership of an
immovable through ten year acquisitive prescription.7 They are
(1) good faith, (2) just title, (3) possession during the time
required by law, and (4) an object susceptible to acquisition
through prescription. While Hunter involves each of the four
criteria to a certain degree, this note deals primarily with good
faith and possession during the time required by law.'
and this petitory action was brought within the time allowed by the judge in that case.
S. D. Hunter Foundationv. Board of Corm'rs, 286 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
However, the court in the instant case held that the decision in the possessory action
was not res judicata with respect to the petitory action and found plaintiff to be in
possession of part of the land.
4. The defendants in this case were the S. D. Hunter Foundation and the widow
of Hunter. Hunter acquired all the property and left it to his wife and the Foundation.
Both the defendants and Hunter himself will be referred to as defendants in this note.
5. A quitclaim deed is defined as one intending "to pass on any title, interest,
or claim the grantor may have in the premises, but not professing that such title is
valid, nor containing any warranty or convenants of title." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
1417 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
6. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3517.
7. LA. CIv. CoDE art. 3479 states:
To acquire the ownership of immovables by the species of prescription
which forms the subject of the present paragraph, four conditions must concur:
1. Good faith on the part of the possessor.
2. A title which shall be legal, and sufficient to transfer the property.
3. Possession during the time required by law, which possession must be accompanied by the incidents hereafter required.
4. And finally an object which may be acquired by prescription.
8. The Hunter case also dealt with the effect of a 1938 statute which made it
impossible to acquire levee board lands by acquisitive prescription. 1938 La. Acts, No.
76, repealed by 1944 La. Acts, No. 247. The issue confronted was whether this statute
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Article 3451 defines the good faith possessor as one who
"has just reason to believe himself the master of the thing

which he possesses, although he may not be in fact; as happens
to him who buys a thing which he supposes to belong to the
person selling it to him, but which, in fact, belongs to another.'" This good faith is always presumed and he who denies
it must rebut the presumption. 0 A blend of both objective and
subjective factors must be examined when determining the
issue of good faith." Therefore, in order for a party to be in good
faith, he must not only subjectively believe himself to be the
owner, but this belief must be reasonable under the circum-

stances. This two-pronged examination mandates that each
case be decided on its own facts, making it very difficult, if not
impossible, to generalize that any one set of facts will always
result in a finding of good or bad faith."
interrupted or merely suspended prescription. The subject is quite complex and demands an in-depth analysis, making this note an improper forum for its resolution.
Thus, the topic will be treated only briefly and in this footnote only.
The Hunter court held that the statute interrupted defendant's prescription and
thereby nullified the accumulation of all previous years of possession. The majority felt
that the articles concerning suspension of prescription, Civil Code articles 3521-27,
deal with an existing inability to enforce a right, such as minority, interdiction or
marriage. Finding no such inability present here, the court felt that the only alternate
solution was that the statute interrupted prescription.
However, if one applies the same reasoning to the articles dealing with interruption of prescription, Civil Code articles 3516-20, it becomes obvious that a statute's
repeal is not contemplated there either. The articles deal with two major ways by
which prescription may be interrupted: 1) by an actual deprivation of possession of
the prescriber, or 2) by a suit filed against him. Obviously, neither of these occurred.
Thus, using the court's reasoning, prescription was not interrupted either.
The solution seems to be found in Civil Code article 3521, which is under the
heading of suspension, saying that prescription runs against all unless excepted by law.
The articles following give examples of groups excepted by law such as minors and
those discussed above. Under the scheme of the Code, once the handicap is removed
from these groups, prescription runs again at the point at which it was suspended.
Therefore, the levee board could not be prescribed against because it was excepted by
law. Once this exception was removed, the Code seems to state that the time should
be treated as a suspension and not an interruption.
9. LA. CMv. CODE art. 3451. See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 503.
10. "Good faith is always presumed in matters of prescription; and he who alleges bad faith in the possessor must prove it." LA. Cv. CODE art. 3481.
11. Johnson, Good Faith as a Condition of Ten Year Acquisitive Prescription,34
TuL. L. REv. 671, 673 (1960); Comment, The Ten-Year Acquisitive Prescription of
Immovables, 36 LA. L. Rlv. 1000, 1002 (1976).
12. Comment, The Ten-Year Acquisitive Prescription of Immovables, 36 LA. L.
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The courts of Louisiana did attempt just such a generalization when determining the effect of a quitclaim deed on the
good faith of the vendee. Early jurisprudence held that a claim
of ten year acquisitive prescription could not be based on a
quitclaim deed because these deeds were indicative of bad
faith.'3 However, in 1930, this line of jurisprudence was overturned in Perkins v. Wisner" which held that one may not
automatically impute bad faith to a vendee who buys through
a quitclaim deed. The Perkins court relied extensively on a
United States Supreme Court opinion which rebutted the argument that a vendor would not sell by quitclaim unless he had
doubts about the validity of his title.' 5 The Supreme Court
pointed out that there may be many reasons why a vendor
would refuse to warrant his title even though he has no doubts
about its validity; he may be a trustee, a corporate executive,
or a guardian, and thus understandably reluctant to warrant
title, or he may refuse for reasons known only to himself.'"
REV. 1000, 1002 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Hughey v. Barrow, 4 La. Ann. 248 (1849); Avery v. Allain, 11 Rob.
436 (La. 1845); Thomas v. Kean, 10 Rob. 80 (La. 1845); Reeves v. Towles, 10 La. 276
(1836).
14. 171 La. 898, 132 So. 493 (1930).
15. Id. at 495. The Supreme Court case relied on was Moelle v. Sherwood, 148
U.S. 21 (1892).
16. 148 U.S. at 28-29. The court stated:
The doctrine expressed in many cases that the grantee in a quitclaim deed
cannot be treated as a bona fide purchaser does not seem to rest upon any sound
principle. It is asserted upon the assumption that the form of the instrument
. . . indicates that there may be other and outstanding claims or interests which
may possibly affect the title of the property, and, therefore, it is said that the
grantee . . . cannot be a bona fide purchaser. . . . This assumption we do not
think justified . . . . There may be many reasons why the holder of property

may refuse . . . to execute a conveyance in such form as to imply a warranty of
any kind even when the title is known to be perfect. He may hold the property
only as a trustee or in a corporate or official character, and be unwilling for that
reason to assume any personal responsibility as to its title . . . or he may be
unwilling to do so from notions peculiar to himself; and the purchaser may be
unable to secure a conveyance of the property desired in any other form than
one of quitclaim .

. .

. It would be unreasonableto hold that, for his inability

to secure any other form of conveyance, he should be denied the position and
character of a bona fide purchaser, however free, in fact, his conduct in the
purchase may have been from any imputation of the want of good faith. (Emphasis added.)
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Thus, the automatic imputation of bad faith to a vendee who
could obtain no more than a quitclaim deed is unreasonable
according to the Court.
The question of quitclaim deeds and their effect on good
faith reappeared in a different context in 1931. In Nugent v.
Urania Lumber,'7 a circuit court was faced with determining
the good faith of a vendee who bought property in a single deed,
part warranted as to title and part by quitclaim, and who was
asserting ownership through ten year prescription. The court
refused to find this set of circumstances automatically indicative of bad faith."8 However, in 1973, the same operative facts
were present in Board of Commissionersof Port of New Orleans
v.Delacroix Corporation," and a different circuit held that
such facts were necessarily indicative of the vendee's bad faith
because he was put on notice that "something was wrong."
This "something," the court explained, was that the vendor
must have had doubts about the quitclaimed property or he
would not have transferred it by quitclaim only."0 Thus, at the
time of Hunter, the courts were consistent in holding that
deeds transferring either with a complete warranty or completely by quitclaim provided no automatic obstacle to a finding of good faith; however, when the two circumstances were
combined in one act of sale, the circuits were in disagreement
as to the effect on good faith.
The law dealing with the second major issue in Hunter,
that of adverse possession sufficient to interrupt possession and
therefore prescription, has had a less confusing history in
Louisiana. Hunter forced the court to discuss two main issues
in this area: (1) the ability of constructive possession to interrupt corporeal possession and (2) the determination of what
conduct constitutes possession sufficient to actually interrupt,
as opposed to merely disturb, possession so as to interrupt prescription.
The doctrine of constructive possession is defined in Civil
Code article 3437 which states that possession of part of a tract
17.
18.
19.
20.

16 La. App. 73, 133 So. 420 (2d Cir. 1931).
Id. at 422.
274 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 748.
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of land will constitute possession of the whole if this is the
intention of the possessor." 1 However, the courts have not given
this article the broadest possible interpretation and have held
that the doctrine is inapplicable if another party is corporeally
possessing the property or any part of it.22 Thus, in Robertson
v. Morgan,0 the circuit court restricted the use of the doctrine
by holding that plaintiff's constructive possession was lost
when interrupted by defendant's corporeal possession. Later,
in Souther v. Domingue,24 another circuit held that in a factual
situation involving the opposite circumstances, "mere constructive possession was.

. .

insufficient to oust.

. .

corporeal

'" 3

possession. Thus, while corporeal possession is sufficient to
oust constructive possession, constructive possession is not
strong enough to interrupt or oust corporeal possession.
The most clear and concise discussion of this entire concept of adverse possession interrupting existing possession is
found in Liner v.LouisianaLand and Exploration Co." There,
as a defense to a possessory action, it was argued that since
plaintiff had not enjoyed possession quietly and without
interruptionfor a year prior to the disturbance, as required to
bring a possessory action,27 he had no cause of action. Justice
Tate, in a well reasoned concurrence denying an application for
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3437 states: "It is not necessary, however, that a person
wishing to take possession of an estate should pass over every part of it; it is sufficient
if he enters on and occupies a part of the land, provided it be with the intention of
possessing all that is included within the boundaries."
22. Souther v. Dorningue, 238 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Robertson v.
Morgan, 116 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1959).
23. 116 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1959).
24. 238 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 266. Interestingly, Justice Tate, the author of the instant opinion,
earlier wrote the apparently conflicting Souther opinion while serving on the First
Circuit Court of Appeal.
26. 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975)
27. One of the requirements for bringing the possessory action under Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 3662 is that the plaintiff has been in quiet and peaceful
possession for a year prior to the disturbance complained of. Although Liner dealt with
a possessory action, it is relevant to Hunter for two reasons: (1) the one year of undisturbed possession required to bring the possessory action was equated with the one year
of undisturbed possession necessary to interrupt prescription, and (2) Liner dealt with
the issue of what amount of adverse possession is necessary to interrupt, as opposed
to disturb, possession.
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rehearing, clarified the concept of interruption of possession
"for what aid [it] may be in study for future applications of
the article."28 This explanation is pertinent to the instant case
since Hunter held that the defendant's possession was interrupted by the maintenance of the servitude. Justice Tate explained that possession is not interrupted when merely disturbed, but is only interrupted when it is lost. The reasoning
behind this statement was developed as follows: Article 3449
lists two ways in which possession can be lost without the consent of the possessor: (1) the possessor may be expelled and not
allowed to re-enter, or (2) a third party may usurp the possession and hold it for a year without the possessor attempting to
regain it."O The question which is raised by this article is
whether it actually establishes two modes of loss of possession
or just one. Tate pointed out that if article 3449(1) defines a
mode of losing possession, then article 3449(2) becomes superfluous because the first mode will always be satisfied before the
second. Thus, he states article 3449(1) is a mode of losing physical possession while 3449(2) is a mode of losing the right to
possess.' This interpretation resulted in the conclusion that
only article 3449(2) is a mode of interrupting, as opposed to
disturbing, possession. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that this time limit of one year coincides with the time necessary to commence the right to possess3' and with the time necessary to interrupt prescription. 2 Therefore, the right to possess is not lost and prescription is not interrupted by adverse
possession unless a possessor is evicted and remains out of
possession for over a year.
28.
29.

319 So. 2d at 779 (Tate, J., concurring).
LA. CIv. CODE art. 3449 states:
A possessor of an estate loses the possession against his consent:
1. When another expels him from it, whether by force in driving him away, or
by usurping possession during his absence, and preventing him from re-entering.
2. When the possessor of an estate allows it to be usurped and held for a year,
without, during that time, having done any act of possession, or interfered with
the usurper's possession.
30. The right to possess differs from the mere physical possession in many
ways-e.g., the right to bring a possessory action and the right to keep the fruits if the
possession was in good faith.
31. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3662(2).
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3517.
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The facts of the Hunter case lent themselves to a thorough
examination of article 3479 and more particularly, to the issues
discussed above. Defendant had obtained two separate plots of
land from two different vendors, both under acts of sale which
transferred part with warranty and part by quitclaim deed.
One tract, the disputed George Tract, was purchased in 1951
and therefore was insusceptible to a defense of thirty year acquisitive prescription. Thus the defendant relied on a defense
of ten year prescription which the court rejected, holding that
the defendant lacked the necessary good faith to sustain such
a defense since the property had been acquired under a single
deed containing both a warranted sale and a quitclaim deed.
The court decided that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have been put on guard that his vendee
lacked ownership and therefore could not be found to have been
in good faith. In this regard the court held, "this circumstance
[part warranted, part by quitclaim] alone should have been
sufficient, under the jurisprudence cited, to raise doubt in the
purchaser's mind as to the vendor's title to the non-warranted
. . . [tract], so as to defeat his good faith at the time of ac-

quisition.' '3
The other tract, the Powell Tract, was acquired in 1948.
Again, the land was acquired through one act of sale transferring part in warranty and part by quitclaim deed. Although
plaintiff took note of this fact and argued absence of good faith,
the court found it unnecessary to answer the question of good
faith. Instead, the court opted to journey into another cloudy
area of Louisiana property law, that of interruption of prescription by adverse possession. In 1951, plaintiff granted a pipeline
servitude to a third party who built the pipeline in the same
year and maintained the twenty-foot wide servitude up to and
during the trial. The court reasoned that the maintenance of
the servitude had interrupted defendant's possession under
article 3449(2),"' thereby interrupting prescription as to that
area. Next, the court reasoned that under the doctrine of constructive possession"5 the construction of the pipeline and
33. 354 So. 2d at 162 (emphasis added).
34. For the text of article 3449, see note 29, supra.
35, LA. Civ. CODE art. 3437. For the text of this article, see note 22, supra.
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maintenance of the servitude interrupted the possession and
thereby the prescription as to the entire 160 acre tract. Thus,
the court held defendant was not in legal possession at the time
of the trial."
An analysis of the reasoning of the court in Hunter discloses a plethora of problems and unresolved issues. Exemplary
of these problems is the court's analysis of good faith. The court
seemed to deny the presumption of good faith granted to all
possessors by article 3481;37 it never addressed the subjective
good faith of the defendant and stated instead that, "where a
deed itself indicates that a seller may not own the entirety of
the property conveyed, the buyer is not presumed.

. .

to be a

faith. '"

For this proposition, the court cited
purchaser in good
Bel v. Manuel," in which a claim of ten year prescription based
on a deed conveying an undivided interest in certain property
was denied for want of good faith."0 The court in Bel not only
held that the deed alone put the vendee on notice but was also
swayed by the fact that the vendee had already purchased an
undivided interest in the property from a separate vendor and,
therefore, must have been aware that he was not purchasing
the entire tract." This examination and recognition that the
vendee lacked subjective good faith in Bel distinguishes it from
Hunter, since in the latter, the court refused to investigate the
subjective good faith of the defendant relying solely on the
opinion that any good faith under this deed would be unreasonable.'
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See note 3, supra.
See note 10, supra, for the text of article 3481.
354 So. 2d at 162.
234 La. 135, 99 So. 2d 58 (1958).
The Bel court was reluctant to allow a claim of ten year acquisitive prescrip-

tion to be based on a title which transferred only the vendor's undivided interest.
However, feeling bound to follow prior jurisprudence, the court chose to deny the claim
on another ground. The court's lack of conviction would seem to weaken the strength
of the case as authority concerning good faith.
41. 234 La. at 138, 99 So. 2d at 61.
42. The dissent of Chief Justice Sanders considered the subjective good faith of

the defendant and argued that the acts of sale alone did not constitute bad faith. Thus,
the Chief Justice would have held that the defendant owned both tracts through ten
year prescription. 354 So. 2d at 156 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
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The Huntercourt, quoting from Boyet v. Perryman,3 went
on to state that "if a deed gives the purchaser any fact which
should 'put a reasonably prudent person on guard, it then devolves upon him to pursue every lead and ferret out all the facts
to the end that he may not purchase until he has complete
information before him'."" The quoted case dealt with a
vendee who had bought property through a deed which contained a legally deficient description of the land it purported
to transfer. Therefore any relevancy the case has to the instant
case is by analogy only. Further, the court lifted the quote out
of context and altered its meaning. In its original form the
quote read, "if the deed. . . contains a vague. . . description
• . . and [if] it is necessary for the vendee to institute an
investigation. . . and [if] such examination reveals facts and
conditions which should put a reasonably prudent person on
guard,"" then one must search and ferret out the facts. Even
if one interprets Boyet as controlling in any case involving a
deed which should put a reasonable person on notice, its relevancy to the instant case is still dependent on the basic premise
that this deed is one which should have put defendant on notice. Reliance on this premise is a weakness in the court's logic
which is readily apparent if the premise is examined.
The Hunter court felt that the deed alone destroyed the
good faith of the defendant simply because it contained a warranted transfer and a quitclaimed transfer. In other words, the
court felt that even if defendant had believed in his title, an
issue the court never addressed, the claim would still have
failed since this would have been unreasonable under the circumstances." To strengthen this view the court called attention to and approved of two circuit court cases, Delacroix and
Board of Commissionersfor Lafourche Basin Levee District v.
Elmer.'7 In Delacroix, the court concluded that the vendor
''was aware of some deficiency in title for otherwise a portion
of the property would not have been conveyed without war43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

240
354
240
See
268

La. 339, 123 So. 2d 79 (1960).
So. 2d at 162.
La. at 351-352, 123 So. 2d at 83. (emphasis added).
text at note 11, supra.
So. 2d 274 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 675 (1972).
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ranty of title."'" By imputing this doubt of the vendor to the
vendee, the court found an absence of good faith.
This argument has two basic flaws: (1) the assumption
that the vendor's bad faith should automatically be imputed
to the vendee, and (2) the assumption that the deed is necessarily indicative of the vendee's doubts. That a vendor lacked
confidence in his title should be totally irrelevant to his
vendee's confidence in the title, unless that lack of confidence
is conveyed to the vendee by the deed itself or by some other
means which would put the vendee on notice that the title was
invalid. Since the Hunter court never addressed the area of
subjective good faith (notice by some other means) the only
way the court could have found bad faith was through objective
bad faith (notice in the deed itself).
In so holding, the court relied upon and approved
Delacroix. The reasoning employed in Delacroix and followed
in Hunter embodies the exact argument which was termed
unreasonable by the United States Supreme Court in 189211
and rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Perkins v.
Wisner in 1930.5 Nevertheless, the Hunter court adopted the
Delacroix reasoning over that of Nugent." The only possible
method of reconciling the entire line of cases is to distinguish
Hunter by the presence of the mixed warranties in one deed.
Thus, the second flaw in the court's argument becomes
evident. Why does this circumstance alter the reasoning that
a quitclaim deed is not necessarily indicative of bad faith? The
court failed to give reasons why it should and it seems clear
that it should not. Had the land passed by two separate acts,
one warranted and the other a single quitclaim deed, the court
could not, without reverting to pre-Perkins jurisprudence,52
48. 274 So. 2d at 748.
49. Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 21 (1892). See note 16, supra.
50. See text at note 14, supra.
51. The court also made reference to Board of Comm'rs. for Lafourche Basin
Levee Dist. v. Elmer, 268 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 675
(1972). This case, like Bel and unlike Hunter, investigated the subjective good faith
of the vendee and remanded the case to determine whether the price of the sale was
so low as to put this vendee on notice. The case does not support the proposition that
the Hunter deed alone put the defendant on notice because the Elmer court went
further and investigated the subjective good faith of the vendee.
52. See text at note 12, supra.
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have held defendant in bad faith on the contents of the deed
alone. The court would have been forced to look at the subjective good faith of the vendee to see if his belief was reasonable
under the circumstances, just as the court should have done
here.
Thus, the illogic behind the good faith determination is
apparent. The premise that the deed alone could put the
vendee in bad faith has no justification in the jurisprudence or
the Code. Furthermore, the decision is inconsistent with the
basic policy behind ten year acquisitive prescription of protecting a good faith vendee by finalizing his title. A good faith
vendee may assert a claim of acquisitive prescription after a
much shorter time of possession because he is unaware of the
flaws in his title. This difference in time can, and very often
does, mean the difference between retaining the property
against an adverse claimant and losing it. Therefore, the courts
should be very reluctant to find a vendee in bad faith and deny
him this protection on the contents of his deed alone. Only in
the most obvious cases should a court hold that under a certain
set of circumstances any belief in one's title is totally unreasonable. That this is not such an obvious case should be apparent
once one realizes that had the defendant purchased through
two separate acts, the court would have been forced to examine
subjective good faith.
When the court addressed the issue of interruption of possession of the Powell Tract, it embarked on another course of
questionable logic. 3 The court was clearly correct when it held
that the defendant had lost its possession of the twenty-foot
strip. The area was corporeally possessed by the plaintiff's
grantee for over a year without the defendant attempting to
53. One problem with the discussion of the interruption of possession was ever
discussing it at all. The court stated that since the possession was interrupted, there
was no need to discuss the question of good faith. It seems clear that it would have
been more judicially efficient if the court had used the bad faith argument set forth in
discussing the George Tract since the acts of sale were identical in both transactions.
Having had the ten year defense destroyed by this bad faith argument, the defendant
could have resorted only to a defense of thirty year prescription. With the court's
determination of the issue of interruption by the statute (see note 8, supra), this
defense also would have failed and the same result would have occurred without
venturing into this cloudy area.
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regain it. Thus possession and prescription were both interrupted. 5' On the other hand, there is no justification for the
holding that this possession by plaintiff interrupted the defendant's possession as to the entire tract. As was stated in Justice
Tate's concurrence in Liner, possession is only interrupted
when it is lost.15 Since plaintiff was not physically possessing
any of the remainder of the tract, the only argument to sustain
the court's conclusion is the doctrine of constructive possession.5 ' However, as explained above," the jurisprudence has
held that constructive possession cannot outweigh corporeal
possession. This is so because the adverse claimant must actually put the possessor on notice that he is intending to take
possession of his land.8 When one party is corporeally possessing land, the party wishing to usurp the possession must do so
with a type of possession that is at least as strong as the current
possessor's. In Hunter, defendant had corporeal possession
whereas plaintiff was constructively possessing, at best. There
is no evidence that defendant ever lost corporeal possession as
to the remainder of the tract. On the contrary, the evidence
showed that defendant continued to possess by erecting fences,
posting signs and leasing the land for grazing purposes. Certainly, this corporeal possession was enough for defendant to
retain possession even if the initial construction of the pipeline
disturbed it and plaintiffs constructive possession should have
been insufficient to interrupt it. Thus, the Hunter court has
allowed a clandestine possession 0 to interrupt an open and
corporeal possession.
The above discussion should suffice to point out the problems one encounters in Hunter, but two potential fact situa54. Possession was interrupted under Civil Code article 3449 and prescription
was interrupted under article 3517.
55. See text at notes 26-32, supra.
56: See text at note 21, supra.
57. See text at notes 22-25, supra.
58. Comment, Elementary Considerationsin the Commencement of Prescription
on Immovable Property, 12 TtL. L. Rav. 608, 611 n.14 (1938).
59. Board of Comm'rs of the Caddo Levee Dist. v. S.D. Hunter Foundation, 342
So. 2d 720, 727 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
60. 1 M. PLANIOL, CnML LAW TREATISE, pt. 1, at 346 (lst ed. La. St. L. Inst.
Transl. 1959).
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tions may help to further emphasize the dangers that have
been created by the holdings. After Hunter, if a vendor sells in
a single act of sale, two tracts of land, one owned by him personally and fully warranted and the other owned by a trust of
which he is the trustee and sold by quitclaim, his vendee will
always be found to be in bad faith. Since this will be decided
on the deed alone, it will make no difference if the vendee was
fully confident that the title was valid and the property his.
The court in such a case can cite Hunter and never question
the subjective good faith of the vendee-he will be in bad faith
as a matter of law.
Secondly, assume that a person corporeally possesses a
1,000 acre tract of land. Does Hunter support the proposition
that the holder of title need only possess a twenty-foot strip of
land across one corner in order to interrupt possession of the
entire tract even though the first possessor still retains corporeal possession of the remainder? It seems that Hunter holds
precisely that. In both of these hypothetical situations, the
inequitable results that may arise from future applications of
the court's holding become readily apparent.
Paul Slocomb West

